A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR VIEWING POLLUTION PROBLEMS by Langham, Max R.
SOUTHERN  JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL  ECONOMICS  December,  1971
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR VIEWING
POLLUTION  PROBLEMS
Max  R. Langham*
INTRODUCTION
In  the  1960's,  we  developed a strong public  con-  work suggested is  based  on the concept of consumers'
science about the environment,  The  1970's will reveal  and  producers'  surplus which  dates back  to Marshall
a  great  deal  about  our  ability  to  better  understand  [14,  pp,  124-132,  811]  Though  controversial  [9,
and  manage  the  environment  in  socially  acceptable  17],  this  measure of welfare has been widely used  8,
ways.  This  task  will  require  both  theories  and  10,  15,  18, 19]mainly,  because  researchers working
measurement  techniques  to  empirically  verify  them,  on an  applied problem  have  found  the concept to be
A  welfare  theory  (based  largely  on  Paretlan  welfare  empirically  operational,  Before  discussing  this  theo-
economics)  states  that  we  can  say  one  system  is  retical framework,  I will briefly  consider the concept
preferable  to another if the system makes at least one  of an' externality  and  allocative  mechanisms  to deal
person better  off and no one worse  off. Most alterna-  with public goods and externalities,
five  systems  in  the  real world,  including  those avail-
able  to  resolve  pollution  conflicts,  do  not meet this  ON ALLOCATING
criterion.  A  change  in  the  system  normally  makes  ENVIRONMENTAL  RESOURCES
someone  worse  off.  Thus,  Paretian,  or  the  "new,"
welfare  economics,  is not  really  useful  in  making  In its simplest  form, an externality exists when the
most  policy  decisions.  The problem is compounded,  actions  of one  party, B, affects  the utility or produc-
because  often  we  do not  know  how to measure  the  tion  function  of another party, A. Whether  or not A
real  effects  of  pollution  on  parties  involved  in  and  will  actually  try to influence  B's action depends upon
influenced  by pollution.  This  later problem is aggra-  the  costs  and  benefits  of  his  doing  so.  If A  is mo.
vated  by  the  fact  that  we  have  done  very  little  to  tivated  to  attempt  to  influence  the action  of B, the
systematically  record  observations  on  pollution  externality  may be  termed potentially  relevant  [1,  p.
processes.  The  sheer  size  of the  observational  task is  373].  An  externality  may  create  economies  or  dis-
staggering.  All we  can ever  hope to do is observe life  economies,  but it is the diseconomies which generally
forms  which seem  to be critical indicators of harmful  create  conflict.
pollutants.  Filter  feeders and life  forms (such as man)
at the  ends of food chains  are the most  likely  candi-  Pollution  problems  are  generally  caused  by  tech-
dates.  Many  important  variables  are  not  observable  nological  external  diseconomiest created  by  some
because  of our inability to measure  them  and others  party  who  uses  a  resource  such  as  air  or  water  as
are just  not  recognized  as being  important  with the  though  it  were  a  free  good  and  neglects  any  costs
current  state  of knowledge.  Lack  of  data  seriously  which  may  be  inflicted  on  others.  Consequently,
handicaps  applied  research.  The  theoretical  frame-  there  is an inefficient  allocation of resources because
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1A technological  externality  is one that is transferred from one decision unit to another by a technical or physical linkage  [12, p.
41].  Externalities  can also  be pecuniary,  in which  case they are transmitted by a market mechanism  and do not generally lead to
what is considered an inefficient resource allocation.
1not all costs enter  the polluter's resource use decision.  solution  which is optimal  in some socially  meaningful
sense.
Some  pollution  problems  arise  quite  innocently
because  what  is  right  or  wrong  concerning  the  en-  Demsetz  [5]  has  stressed  the importance  of con-
vironment is  situation  sensitive  and continual  change  trol  over  the behavior  of individuals which  any allo-
can  bring  about  new  situations  quite  subtly.  As our  cative  mechanism  must have  and the  real world  cost
population  and  economic  activities  increase  at grow-  of  this  control.  Clearly,  if benefits  from an  optimal
ing  rates  in  our finite  environment,  there  are  greater  allocation  of  environmental  resources  are  not  suf-
opportunities  and dangers  of one's actions creating an  ficient  to  cover  the  cost  of  control  with  whatever
externality.  Because  of  this  situation,  each decision-  allocative  mechanism  (centralized  or decentralized)  is
maker should  be more  alert to the implications of his  required  to attain  the benefits,  society  will be better
actions.  off with unabated  pollution. If the rewards to society
from pollution  abatement  are  sufficient  to cover  the'
Theoretically,  in  a  costless  bargaining  situation,  institutional  costs  of  providing  an  allocative  rnech-
two  parties  will  resolve  an  environmental  dispute in  anism,  the question of how much pollution is socially
an  economically  efficient  (Pareto  optimal)  manner.  optimal  still  remains, as  does  the associated  problem
The  distribution  of the benefits  from pollution will,  of how the costs and benefits from attaining this level
of c¢urse:,  be-affected:  by the assignment  of property  ofpollution should be distributed.  : 
rights  Over  time, costs and-benefits do influence the  . ' - . . .,'^
assignment:  of  :property  rights  [16,  pp.  592-633,  Society  might  use a majority:vote to settle  pollu-
especialy- p.  602] . However,  the.,assignment  of  tion  conflicts.  In this case  the vote  would have to bei
property  rights,  svith  the  associated  ethical  implica-  unanimous  if  such an approach  is  to be Pareto  opi-
tions,  islargely  a  function-of  the legal  and political  mal.  Regardless  of  the  means  chosen  to  allocate
process. The political  processes;can, of'course, specify  environmental  resources, policymakers need measures
a solution to the allocation problem byrestricting the  of the  social,.costs  and  benefits  for various  leve!  s  of
bargaining  'process.  Much  to,  the.  chagrin  of  environmental:pollution.  Let us turn to a  theoretical
economists  this  political  solution  to  :the  allocation  framework  which:may  be  of  use  to  the-applied:  e-
problem  may  be  at  considerable  variance  to  the  searcher in  an attempt to assess benefits  from-alterna,
economic  solution.  Regardless  of who holds property  tive  policies.  The  framework  provides  .no-  help li
rights,  the partiies'c'anf:  findit 'to their  mutual benefit  measuring .the  costs  of  providing-the  institutional
to pollute  the environment up to that point where  B's  mechanism  for administering  a  particular-policy,:  and
net  marginal gain from-polluting  the environment will  it provides  only..a partial equilibrium  analysis.  -. ;
equal'the' marginal  cost  to -A  of  having his  environ-  ;  - :  . . - ..  .
ment:polluted." Because  of  this  result,  some  econo-  - A THEORETICALFRAMEWORK; .:::,
mists  agree :' that  'pollution:  problems:  should  be  :re--  - ;  - . ;  .--  ' .?
solved in a bargaining type framework.  . . ,:  -Suppose :that, a farmer's  demand  for fertilizer  itto
v  :  - ...... ".  ... '''"  .... :  '•:-  ....  ;produce  a: crop -is  given  by  D  and  that: he  faces  a
' Most' agricultural :pollutants enter the' environment  perfectly  elastic  -supply  function,  -,  for thep  input  so
via  twov  free';goods-aird  and  ground  water.  Whether  that -under: conditions  of  a  free  market;  the  farmer
ma'na'i'  'capable  of 'developing  a-  decentralized  wouldmaximize  profits byusingq  .units.offertiizer
mechanism  which will serve the allocative function  of  (Figure  1).  Further,  suppose  that the farme's use  of
a  market  in  such  public  goods with externalities  re-  the  chemical  has environmental  implications depicted
mains  undertermined.2' The  market  mechanism  has  by  environmental  damage  or  externality  function  E.
not  functioned  'for ithese:  resources  because  of  the  This  function  is  a relationship  between  the net mar-
market  requirement  for provisions of ownership,.con-  ginal  social  cost  of  fertilizer  pollution  (measured  im
trol,' and  exclusion':[4,  pp.  362362-363].:At  present  it  value  of dollars  to  the producer)  and the quantity  of
seems  that  some  judicial  administrative  process  will  fertilizer  used. The  assumption  of knowledge of such
be required  to' strongly  assist  the  allocative  process.  a  function  is a very strong assertion. Bound-up in this
Economists  worry  about  such  processes  because  of  theoretical  function  are  all  the  social  costs  of  the
the  difficulty  of  establishing  that  a  particular  allo-  "spill over"  effects  of the input on  the environment
cative  device  will lead to (or  perhaps even  toward)  a  [6,  pp. 66-103] . If the price of fertilizer had included
".  - ,  h  ;  i  -e.t.  . ..  p  o:
2Hurwicz  [1111  has  been  interested  in  the  problem  of  institutional  processes  which  have  some  hope  of  performing  as  a
competitive  system.  He  suggests  that  we  accept  as  competitive  those  processes  for  which  informational  decentralization  is
possible.  More  recently  he has  been considering  decentralized mechanisms for internalizing  externalities.  Davis and Whinston  [2]
and  an  exchange  between  Wellisz  [20]  and  Davis  and  Whinston  [3]  have  contributed  to  the  question  of how to  internalize
externalities in a decentralized  decision process.
'2the environmental  cost,  the farmer would have found  may  have  a  relative  advantage  in  the  adjustment
it most profitable  to  use  only q2 units of fertilizer  as  process.  The  distribution  of benefits of social  action
indicated by his new derived demand D . to  clean up the environment  is an important issue for
the  social  scientist  but  one  which  is  not considered
$  herein.
In  this  simplified  one  input  (x),  one  output  (y),
knowledgeable  world,  the  anlaysis  can  also  be  de-
ad  picted  in  terms  of the  optimal  quantity  of product
(Figure  2).  The  profit  maximizing  solution  for  the
farmer  when  the  externalities  are  ignored  is ql. And,
it  is q1  when externalities  are included  in the produc-
tion  decision.  Ey  =  E  ().  Again  this  is  a
np  x  _______  ^b  S  shortrun  static  result.  Since adjustment  at the  indus-
1-  |  2  X  i\^^~  ^try  level  would be expected to increase  price from py
I  ^  X^^  \D  to  p  , the  equilibrium  after all adjustments would be
I\  \  D  q3-
D-  E  $  E  +S D'  D  - E  $  y  E  S
o  P  y  d,  ,  ,  _ D' Y
q2 q3 q1 Fertilizer  ' 
FIGURE  1 
The  farmer's gain  from using  fertilizer  in  an unre- 
stricted  manner  is  represented by  the area plbd  and  a 
the  cost  to  society  by  Oqle.  The  farmer  would  be  i  I
willing  to use additional fertilizer,  and pay society for 
the privilege if he had to,  as long as his marginal gain  0 
was greater  than the marginal  cost  to society  (i.e., at  q2q3  Product  y
the level  of input being considered,  D'  >  S),  assum-
ing  a  free market  situation.  Similarly,  if the marginal  FIGURE 2
cost  to society had  to be paid by the farmer and was
greater  than  the  farmer's  marginal  revenue  (i.e.,  S  To  be  more  realistic  the  idea  of bringing  exter-
>  D'),  it  would  pay  the  farmer  not  to  use  the  nalities into the  decision framework can be expanded
marginal  increment  of fertilizer.  Thus,  the  quantity  into a multi-input,  multi-product model.  Consider the
q2 would  represent a  shortrun  socially  optimal  equi-  folowing production  function  with n inputs and two
librium in a frictionless ceterus paribus world.  products  where  the  first  m  inputs  may  pollute  the
environment:
If all  farmers  have  to pay  the social  cost  of their  y  = f(x.  , xm; x  x;21  ...
externalities,  one  would  expect  the  industry  supply  m  m+ 
function  for  the  product  being  produced  with  fer-  Again,  assume  the  producer  faces  perfectly  elastic
tilizer  to shift  to the left and to  raise the price of the  functions  for  input  supplies  and  product  demands.
product.  This  would  in  turn shift  the individual  far-  With  this  information,  one  can  derive  the  firm's
mer's derived  demand for fertilizer to the right.  After  supply function  for y1 for any  fixed value ofY2, say
all  adjustments  were  completed,  the  firm's  demand  y
for fertilizer might be  as depicted by D"  which yields
a  stable  solution  of  q3. My  colleague,  B.  R.  Given Y2  the well-known conditions on the expan-
Eddleman,  pointed  out that it is possible  for q3 to be  sion path for y,  if externalities  are ignored are:
to  the  right  of q1 if the  firm's  derived  demand  for
fertilizer  shifts  enough.  Since  one  would  expect  a  Pxl  Pxn
reduced  supply  of  product  at  the  industry  level,  a  a  = =
larger  usage  of  the  input  at  the  firm  level  would  Y1  Y1  (1)
indicate  that  the industry  was made  up of fewer and
larger  firms  after the  adjustment  process. Large  firms  x1  an
3With  marginal externalities of the type3 Ei = g(xi), i =  The  externality  or  damage  function  represents  a
1,  ... ,  m,  these  conditions  for  a  socially  optimal  vertical  summation  of  the  m  marginal  externality
expansion path become:  functions  (Ei,  Figure  2)  created  by  the  actions  of
each  producer  at  each  level  of  output.  Again  the
Pxl+Ei=  Px  +Em  _  p  1  P  socially  optimal  level  of  output  for  the  industry  is
—  =m  =—  —  —m+  .= 5=  Q2,  because  Q1 does  not  include  all  the  cost  of
a  ay  a  y  1  ay  supplying  the  economic  good y and therefore  repre-
---  '  ^—  a"m—  a—  sents an  economically  inefficient result.
x,  aXm  axm+l  DXn 
8  (S  +  E  )
(2)  dY  Y
For given  yo, supply functions  associated  with  these
two  expansion  paths  for  y1 might  look  much  the
same  as  S  and  E  +Sy  in  Figure  2.  For  a  given  y
amount  otyl being produced the  two  curves would 
differ by an amount  2
m  P 
m  E  x'  E.  1
frictionless  and  rational  bargaining  qI  will  attain  in 
E i 2
In  the  models  of  Figures  I  and  2,  there  is  a  O 
question  about  the  opportunity  cost  of resources  Q2  Q1  Y
which are  released  from the production process when
the  solution  is  shifted  from  the  qj's  to  the  q3's.  FIGURE 3
Sidestep  this problem  by  assuming  that  alternatives
exist  for  these  displaced  resources  which  are  as  Theoretically,  the  functions  in  Figure  3  derive
socially  desirable as  their use in  the production ofy.  individual  supply and utility functions.  From  a
in  the  models  of  Figures  1  and  2,  there  is  a
a  partial  analysis.  Also,  there  is  no  consideration  o  f  sequences  of deriving  the functions  direct-
which aoe released  from  the  production  process when
socially  desirable  as  their  use  in  the  production  of y.-
what  happened  to prices  of close  substitutes for  the  ly-particularly  since  our profession  has  considerable
commodity  and  the  inputs  used  to  produce  it,  and  experience  with  demand and supply  analyses.  Unfor-
while  we  have  considered  the model only at the farm  tunately,  this expertise  does  not extend  to functions
level,  there  may  be  some  important  considerations  like  E
between the farm and final consumption.  Y'
If one  could determine  the total cost  of pollution
Aggregation  beyond  the  firm  may  be  depicted  as  TC  as a function of output, would
in  Figure  3,  where  curves are represented  in a  linear  P
manner  to simplify exposition.  However,  in order  to  aTC
represent  areas of consumers'  and producers' surplus  P+  Sy
as  a  measure  of  social  welfare,  additional  strong  ay
assumptions  of  a  constant  and  identical  marginal
utility  of  money  for  each  member  of  society  are  yield a  valid  measure  of Sy  + Ey?  The  answer  to the
needed.  Less stringent  assumptions might  be that the  question  would  depend  on  how  much  the marginal
income  effects  due to changes in prices of inputs and  net social  costs of individual  inputs affect the expan-
outputs are negligible.  sion  paths  from  which  Sy  derives.  If  Sy  is  derived
The  demand  and  supply  curves  are  those  for the  from  firm  supply  curves  which  are,  in turn,  derived
industry  and  have  their  bases  in  individual  utility  from  expansion  paths like  (1)  which  are at consider-
functions  and  firm  supply  functions,  respectively.  able  variance  from  the  socially  optimal  expansion
3The Ei's represent net marginal cost functions.
4paths  (2),  then  a  direct  empirical  measure  of  E  y
would  seem  inappropriate.  The  inappropriateness  of
the  estimate  is  based  on  the  fact  that the pollution
observed  and  used  to  estimate  E  was  based  on
production  from  socially  inefficient  resource use pat-
terns.
Does  this result  leave us with  an empty box with
respect  to  determining  social  optima  from  direct
empirical  measurement  of  pollution  costs?  Perhaps
not-at least in those cases where the expansion  paths
of individual  producers  are  not  at  variance  (or only 
slightly  at variance)  with the socially  optimal  expan-
sion paths.  Turn now to  some  examples of pollution 
where  such seems to be the case.  I
EXAMPLES  I  I
Some agricultural pollutants are produced in essen-  ql  q2 Pesticide
tially  rigid  proportions  with  output.  Animal  wastes
(including  odors) from  cattle feedlots  provide a good
example.  In such a case, the wastes  are joint products  FIGURE 4
and  would  not  affect  the  expansion  path  for  the
production of beef under given technology.  pollutant  (the  pesticide  or  the  smoke  from heaters)
may  condition the level of optimal output, but would
Certain inputs  which create  pollution problems  in  have  very  little effect  on input mix,  given that it was
agriculture  may  have  very  little effect  on  the expan-  socially  desirable to save more of the crop than would
sion  path.  For  example,  the  production  response  to  survive without nature receiving  an assist.
certain pesticide sprays is believed by some to take on
the  form  of  a  near  stepped  function  as  depicted  in  In  each  of these  cases where  the  socially efficient
Figure  4.  That  is,  the  product  is  responsive  to  the  expansion  paths  do  not  seem  to  vary  from  the
input  only  over  a  rather  narrow  range  of the  input.  individual  producer's  expansion  path,  a  direct
The  producer must  either use  the input at a rate near  approach  to measuring  environmental  damage  would
q2  or  in  many  cases not  produce.  (This  seems to be  lead  to little bias.  As a  result,  we may,  as agricultural
the  case  in  the winter vegetable  area  of South  Flori-  economists,  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  our  con-
da.)  In such  cases,  the  solution  would  be  relatively  siderable  stock  of knowledge  with regard  to demand
stable  over  a  considerable  range  of pesticide prices so  and  supply  analysis  in  the  study  of pollution  prob-
that  the  inclusion  in price  of the net social  marginal  lems.
cost  due  to  pollution  may  have  little  effect  on  the
expansion  path  which includes  only the private costs  AN OVERALL MATHEMATICAL  MODEL
of inputs.  Another  very  similar  example  is provided
by sugar  cane burning  in South Florida.  It seems that  Frank  Edwards  and I have used such a model in an
if  you  produce  you  must  burn.  Consequently,  the  attempt  to gain some insight into the socially  optimal
input of burning is  similar  to a zero-one variable, and  level  of pesticide  use for an agricultural region  [6,  7] .
the  pollution  from  burning  is  produced  in  some  We  used a  quadratic programming model to  aggregate
rather  fixed  proportion  of  output.  Therefore,  the  across crops.  Our  model assumed that the supply and
input  of  burning  would  have  little  effect  on  the  demand  functions  for  each  crop  were  linear  and
expansion  path  which  includes  only the private  cost  separable.  The  model  we  used  can  be  modified  to
of the inputs.  admit jointly produced or jointly consumed products.
Though  each  production  (consumption)  activity
Another  situation which  may  admit direct estima-  would  assume  that  products  are  produced  (con-
tion  of the environmental  damage  function might  be  sumed)  in  fixed  proportions,  proportions  could  be
termed  the  natural  disaster  or  random  event  case.  varied  by  increasing  the  number  of  activities.  The
Again,  the need  for certain pesticides and for burning  more  general  version  of the  model may  be  stated  as
provide examples.  An insect infestation  (e.g. the army  follows:
worm in  the Midwest) may require  a pesticide to save
a  grain  crop.  Heating  of citrus  groves  in  Florida  to  For  a  set  of pollution abatement policies,  r, r =  1,
reduce  the  damage  of  a  freeze  provides  another  ...  ,  s, rank  the  policies  on  the  basis  of estimated
example.  In such circumstances,  the social cost of the  welfare  Wr, where:
5Wr  = maximum  mi  x  n  hk(zk)=  an  "externality  function,"  a  functional  re-
Wr  maximum  I  I  fi(x)dxi-  ()  lationship  between  the  marginal  cost  of
xiYj Zk  i=l  o  j  =l  pollution  to  society  from  the  use  of input
zk and the quantity of zk used.
+ hj (y))dyjl - Zh(z)dzk  ar  = the quantity  of the  1t  resource required to
j  k=l*  I  produce  a  unit  of  the  jth  product.  This
quantity  could  be  a  fixed  coefficient  or  a
*Integration  from intercept  on yj  (or zi)  axis if  function ofyj.
intercept  occurs  where  yj  (or  Zi)  - 0,  if  not
integration from zero.  b  =  the quantity  of the  . resource  available  for
production in the region being studied.
Subject to.
for~n  (~akj  = the  quantity  of  the  kth  polluting  input
n  a  y  b  frr  =  (3)  required  per  unit  of  the  jt  product  pro-
j=l  y  1 j  b  1  (3'  j  duced under the rth  policy.
=  the  proportion  of  yj  devoted  to  the  ith
product.  If xi and  yj  are  the  same  product
ij =  '. If yi  is  an  activity which produces
<'  Yi -Zk =  ,  for k= 1, .,q  (4)  a  set  of products  in  fixed  proportion,  8ij
j = 1  will be the proportion of yj  yielding product
X i.
x  cXk(zk)=  a  functional  relationship  between  the  kth
i-.  yj = 0,  for i  1, ...  (5)  s  pollutant  which  enters  the  Ath  environ-
j  mental  element  and  the  amount  of  the
pollutant placed in the environment.
where /  >  m  if  a  certain  xi represents  a  set  of
products consumed in fixed  proportions.  Ck  = the  maximum  level  of  the  kth  pollutant
^~~~~~~~~~*  __ ~which  society  is willing to admit in the  A  th
CAk (Zk)< CAk,  for A= 1, ... ,p  (6)  environmental  element.
where:  The  model  can  be  solved  for a  unique  maximum
with  a  separable  program4 if the fi(xi) g(yj), hj(yj),
fi(xi)  =  demand  function  for  the  ith  product.  The  hk(zk),  and  cAk(zk)  meet  necessary  convexity  re-
ith variable  could represent  a set of products  quirements.
being consumed in rigid proportions.
The  objective  function of the model is separable  in
g(yj)  =  supply  function  for  the jth  product  under  the  xi,  yj,  and  zk.  Although,  as  indicated,  joint
the  rth  policy  alternative.  The  jth  product  products  could  be  aggregated  into  one  activity,  the
could  represent  a  set  of  products  being  model as  specified  does  not permit synergistic  effects
produced in  fixed proportions.  among the zk.
hj(yj)  a  "damage"  or  "externality  function,"  a  The  static  nature  of  the model represents  a  gross
functional  relationship  between  the  margi-  abstraction  from  the  real world. One can use longrun
nal  cost  of  pollution  to  society  caused  by  estimates  of supply  and demand. However, the build-
producing  yj  and  the  quantity  of  yj  pro-  up  phenomenon  of  certain  pollutants  is  a  dynamic
duced.  The  pollution  externalities  which  process  and  can  only  be  crudely  accommodated
enter  hr(yj)  should  be  those  which  are  within a static framework.
unique to yj.  Some  externalities result from
an input (e.g.  a  pesticide)  which is  required  The  model permits  externalities  to enter in one of
by  more  than  one  y.  In  such  cases  the  two  ways-either  through hJ(yj)  or hk(Zk). The  inclu-
externalities  should  be  reflected  through  sion  of both  types  of  externality  functions  permits
hk(Zk).  somewhat  more  flexibility  in  structuring  the model.
4 The IBM separable  programming feature of MPS/360  was used to solve a similar  model.
6However,  to  avoid  double  counting,  a  given  exter-  sideration  of  environmental  externalities,  then  the
nality must enter only one of these  functions.  research  process  to determine  a  socially optimal level
of  pollution  must  start  with  production  function
analysis.  However,  if including  pollution externalities
CONCLUSIONS  has  little  effect  on  the  individual  producer's  expan-
sion  path,  the  problem  may be approached  directly
The framework  suggested was a static optimization  from  the product  side. The latter approach is particu-
model.  Economists  may  be  overly  concerned  with  larly  enticing  since  our  profession  has  such  a  rich
optimal  solutions  when  perhaps  they should  look  at  history  and what appear to be reasonably satisfactory
the  real  world situation  as  being  nth  best  and  then  tools for demand  and supply analysis.
direct  their  attention  to  the  economic  problems
associated  with  reducing n.  Such  an approach  would  The estimation  of damage  functions remains as the
make  our  science  less  one of position and more  one  greatest  obstacle to meaningful research.  Data for this
of movement.  Perhaps this approach would make  our  task are almost entirely inadequate.  As applied econo-
recommendations  more  acceptable  to  the  political  mists,  we have been somewhat guilty of playing down
processes which are an important consideration.  How-  the  role  of  observation  and  data  collection  and  of
ever,  if we  ignore theoretical  developments  regarding  dwelling  on techniques which assume the existence  of
position  or equilibrium  (and the associated properties  data.  Those  who  have tried  to do empirical  research
of equilibria)  we may  not be  able  to say much about  on  pesticide  problems  will  recognize  the  need to  let
the direction of needed change.  the pendulum  swing  back to  greater  support for data
collection  and  reporting.  However,  in  this  observa-
As  stated  earlier,  if the socially  optimal expansion  tional  process  we  must  maintain  a  deep  concern  for
path  for  a  producer  is  at considerable  variance  with  theory  or we may end up with the wrong data or data
the  expansion  path  for  that  producer  without  con-  in an unusable form.
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